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This Article explores a social vision of global public order taken from transnational private law. It recasts the potential role of private law in the crossborder economic context as centrally concerned with private action as both
the object and vehicle of substantive and procedural governance. Viewed in
this way, private law is a venue for the contestation and regulation of private
action by private action in the contemporary global system. With its distinctive
strengths and weaknesses, transnational private law is viewed as one alternative among many regimes of global order and is understood to perform a social-indeed, "public"-function in the embedding of private behavior and
relationships within a broader social order.
This Article identifies the function of transnational private law as not
simply facilitation of transactions, but also compensation for harms and social regulation of transnational conduct. Further, it argues that transnational
private law can serve an ideational function in generating communicative
interventions into the sometimes normatively closed national and functional
systems of contemporary society. In serving these regulatory and ideational
functions, transnational private law offers a different vision of global public
order in which the task for state law is not command and control to eliminate
conflict either within or across systems, but rather governance within and
between social systems, including through allowing and sometimes facilitating conflict and contestation. It is with this distinctive vision that this Article begins.
I.

THE VISION OF GLOBAL ORDER IN TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW

A. Isolating the Role of PrivateLaw in Private Order
By isolating the term "transnational private law," this Article attempts to
provide some focus in a field that is defined by unusually expansive objects
and sources. Detlev Vagts's pathbreaking casebook demonstrates the overwhelming range of knowledge considered relevant even for beginning stu-

* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
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dents in the law of transnational business: basic rules of public international
law, the law and institutions of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),
domestic public laws, domestic private laws, non-state norms of practice,
and customized contractual norms.' For scholars such as Vagts, the designation "transnational" was used to signal this larger domain. 2 This Article, in
contrast, focuses on "transnational private law" understood as private international law and national private laws. I deploy this narrower term to isolate
the particular functions of private law inside the larger fields with the object
of transnational economic activity,3 including to distinguish private law from
4
expansive (and vague) uses of lex mercatoria.
B. PrivateInternationalLaw and Real but Civil Conflicts
Private international law offers a distinctive vantage point for observing
the transnational economic order. By private international law I mean the field
of largely domestic rules principally concerned with applicable law, jurisdiction of courts, and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil disputes with aspects that cross jurisdictional borders.
Private international law is an attractive starting point not only because of
its object, but also because of its focus on "conflicts." This focus avoids a stereotyped understanding of private law as concerned with natural market order5
ing or the creation of a frictionless economy.
Private international law offers a different vision of the global order than
do public international law and institutions. Traditionally private international
law has not been burdened with the fixation on consent or cooperative benefits
that marks subjects of public international law, including international trade
regulation. 6 This is partly because private international law rules have largely
been developed at the local level, by legislatures or courts not obliged to ground
their legitimacy in a source based on international consensus. 7 It is also because
the stakes of private international law are not the stakes of public international law. War and depression, the twin nightmares of of public international
1. See DETLEV VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1998).
2. See id. See also PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956).
3. Cf JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000). This admira-

bly broad volume treats private law briefly in a chapter on property and contract, although without identifying it as offering a distinctive regulatory and procedural approach to global business. Private international law hardly figures at all.
4. See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 16 (2003); Clive Schmitthoff, International Business
Law: A New Law Merchant, 2 CURRENT L. & Soc. PROBS. 129 (1961).

5. CUTLER, supra note 4, at 54-59.
6. E.g., Robert Wai, The Commercial Activity Exception to Sovereign Immunity and the Boundaries of Contemporary InternationalLegalism, in TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ThANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 213, 228-39 (Craig Scott ed., 2001) [hereinafter
TORTURE AS TORT].

7. See DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (Lawrence Collins ed., 12th ed. 1993) (hereinafter DICEY & MORRIS] ("The branch of English Law known as the conflict of laws is that part of the
law of England which deals with cases having a foreign element.").
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lawyers and international trade lawyers, especially during the inter-war period, 8 are not the overriding concerns of private international law. Private
law conflicts are instead disputes among private parties about a defective product, an accident, or a violated contract. Focusing away from the extremes of international anarchy permits a calmer view of the role of contestation and dissensus. Private international law is not about order above all other policy values. Instead it is about wrestling with real, but not system ending, conflicts
among private parties.
That private international law concerns not just conflicts between private
parties, but also conflicts among different state legal systems, has sometimes
led to an exaggerated sense of the need for harmony and order. In the U.S.
conflict of laws tradition, the legal realist deconstruction of formalist analysis clearly identified the public policy interests of societies with regard to the
conflict of laws. 9 Governmental interest analysis remains important to U.S.
conflict of laws analysis, 10 but in the most sophisticated understandings, relevant interests include individual concerns, social concerns, and institutional
concerns. 1 This sensibility confuses the idea that the "interest" of states is simply in the application of their own law, or that conflicts are to be avoided at
all costs. The complexity of the policy goals at stake also defies efforts to explain
conflict of laws with any single-factor theory. 2
Among these multiple goals, regulation and governance are a function of
private international law in an era of globalization. 13 Varying the paradigmatic example of the Bhopal litigation, 14 if all jurisdictions with connections to transnational business activity readily accepted jurisdiction (which
the New York court declined to do in the Bhopal case), applied a governing
law with broad liability, and liberally recognized and enforced foreign civil
judgments, the result would be a significantly different terrain for transnational
business decisions. Actors with any cross-border contacts would face the highest
applicable civil standards (driven by plaintiff choice) and might have to refrain from engaging in certain foreign conduct in order to protect against suits.

8. E.g., MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
20-21 (2d ed. 1999).
9. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924);
E. G. Lorenzen, Territoriality,PublicPolicy andthe Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924).
10. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1963).

11. See Joseph W. Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731 (1990); Joseph W.
Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 3 (1989).
12. For instance, law and economics analyses of conflict of laws that focus on shared gains risk assuming away all of the main problems of conflicts. See, e.g., MICHAEL WHINCOP, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM
IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2001).
13. Robert Wai, TransnationalLiftoff andJuridicalTouchdown: The Regulatory Functionof Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209 (2002).
14. In Re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 634 F Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). But see INCONVENIENT FORUM AND CONVENIENT
CATASTROPHE: THE BHOPAL CASE (Upendra Baxi ed., 1986); JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE
OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL (1993).
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Whatever the particular rules chosen, the point is that private international
law involves policy choices with regulatory impact.
C. Underlying Private Law: Policy Goals of Compensation and Contestation
Identifying the regulatory function of private international law requires attention to underlying private law.
Private law encompasses many types of claims, including compensation for
mass accidents through tort litigation, restitution for unjust enrichment, contractual remedies related to misrepresentation and breach of contract, and
breaches of trust and fiduciary duties.1 5 Private law claims may be an effective tool for individual or group claimants seeking compensation from other
private (or public 16) defendants for harm. Under the general rubric of compensation, private law serves a variety of purposes, such as restorative or corrective justice, 17 paternalistic protective functions, 8 and distributive justice
among individuals. 19
In addition to individual compensation, the policy goals of private law include social regulation: to provide public goods, to correct for market failure,
and to contribute to social deterrence. 20 In the U.S. context, this potential
function of private litigation is highlighted by the use of civil litigation and
"private attorneys general" as a major and explicit supplement to public regulation in areas such as product safety, securities, and antitrust. Through the pursuit of their own interests, private litigants serve larger social purposes of
regulation.
These compensatory and regulatory functions of underlying private law are
often obscured in standard treatments of private law in a cross-border economic
context, which tend to emphasize the consensual and cooperative nature of
transnational relations. For example, tort law, unlike contract or property, is
rarely discussed in the law and development work of the World Bank 2' or in
studies of the new institutional economics. 22 Because tort harm is principally that of parties who have not been specifically anticipated and who have
not had the chance to negotiate their relationship with. a tortfeasor, tort is
readily understood as about compensatory or restitutionary claims, and as concerned with regulation and deterrence. In Part II, I will argue that the coop15. For a restatement of the varied social purposes of private law, see Study Group on Social Justice in
European Private Law, SocialJustice in EuropeanContract Law: A Manifesto, 10 EUR. L.J. 653 (2004).
16. This Article does not address private claims against foreign public actors, nor civil litigation pursued by public plaintiffs against private defendants, such as those pursued by U.S. state governments
against tobacco companies.
17. See, e.g., ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
18. E.g., Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalisticMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and UnequalBargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982).
19. E.g., HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 59 (1999).
20. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
21. E.g., WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION (2004).
22. See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
(1990).
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erative frames of contract law should also be understood as embedded in private
law concerns about compensation and regulation.
A focus on underlying private law points to the importance of comparative
law knowledge of foreign legal systems. 23 For example, one cannot really
assess transnational private law in the context of the Bhopal litigation without a sense of the private laws and institutions of, at a minimum, both the
United States and India. 24 This Article is focused on private law and litigation in U.S. venues. Partly this is for simplicity, but also because U.S. law
and process have great practical relevance in the current global system. 25
This is not to defend the U.S. litigation regime as inherently better, nor to
deny that U.S. courts' availability for transnational private litigation is subject to variation. 26 The "American way of law" 27 may be adopted because of
its dominant economic, political, and ideological power, rather than inherent
superiority.28 Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to make transnational use of the
regulatory tools of the most significant world economy and the home jurisdiction of many of the most powerful economic actors. More importantly, private law may be a necessary tool of regulation and governance in a transnational order that resembles the fragmented regulatory authority of the U.S. domestic order, as will be discussed below.
II.

TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
GOVERNANCE PROCESSES OF PRIVATE ORDERING

Transnational private law is one among multiple regimes of cross-border
governance, but one distinguished by its particular mode of governance: indirect
intervention through private contestation and ordering. Through private law,
the state offers a set of background norms and processes that can be used by
private parties to make claims against each other. The state has a necessary
role in this plural system, but it forgoes dominant "command and control"
29
regulation, and acts rather as a kind of indirect "facilitative" actor.

23. There are significant forces pushing toward harmonization of underlying laws-through treaties,
model laws, non-state customary standards, and judicial borrowing-but the process is very farfrom
complete. See Mayo Moran, An Uncivil Action: The Tort of Torture and Cosmopolitan Private Law, in TORTURE AS TORT, supra note 6, at 662.
24. There was much dispute regarding these issues at the time of the Bhopal litigation and also
among academic commentators since then. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Law's Elusive Promise: Learning from
B/opal, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 172 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002).
25. See, e.g., TORTURE AS TORT, supra note 6 (expanding the debate to consider venues other than the

United States).
26. Restraints can come from courts, as in the cautious approach to the Alien Tort Statute. See Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 U.S. 2739 (2004). They can also originate in legislation, as in the recent bill
passed by the U.S. Senate with respect to class actions. See Stephen Labaton, Senate Approves Action to Curb
Big Class Actions, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at Al.
27. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAw (2001).
28. In this sense the theories of Robert A. Kagan, a socio-legal scholar of U.S. adversarial legalism,
meet the analysis of Robert Kagan, foreign policy commentator of U.S. power. See Robert Kagan, Power
and Weakness, 113 POL'Y REV. 3 (2002).
29. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 65.
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A. Private Law and Reflexive Regulation Enabled
The role of private law as a background to private disputing softens the distinction between transactions and litigation. Both litigation of tort claims in
state courts and contractual provisions that customize procedures between
parties can be viewed as forms of regulatory procedures.
30
Contractual relations are exemplary of the idea of reflexive regulation.
Typically contract law mandates very little by way of the content of contractual
relationships; rather the parties are left to negotiate and articulate for themselves the guiding norms of their relationship. This can be done through standards articulated specifically for these parties or by referencing some or all of
the norms of customary practice-such as the customs of a particular trade,
of an ethnic community, or of an expert body or institution.
In the cross-border context, this can be particularly important. Conflicts between different regimes or ambiguities in applicable state standards can be
addressed through contractual negotiation. 31 Even the lacunae of applicable
law can be dealt with through the work of parties and their attorneys. 32 More
comprehensively, the governing law can be designated through a choice of law
clause.
Similar contractual freedom exists with respect to procedures for monitoring and enforcement. 33 State law provides a background dispute settlement
procedure involving the opportunity to make a claim in court for damages or
equitable relief. However, even here parties in contemporary international
transactions can customize further, for instance through the use of forum selection clauses to direct their dispute settlement to the courts of a particular jurisdiction. Finally, parties can choose alternative dispute settlement, ranging
from conciliation to compulsory arbitration.
B. PrivateLaw and the Foundations of Lex Mercatoria
Reflexive measures of monitoring, dispute settlement, and enforcement can
be as disciplinary or regulatory as state systems, and are sometimes more effective and efficient. 34 Moreover, negotiated relations can be a vehicle for the
regulation of behavior with respect to third parties. For example, major retailers
can be seen as advancing social regulation if they can negotiate or compel their
subcontractors to comply with process production standards for environ35
mental or labor conditions.
30. Id. at 65-69; GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 115-19 (1993).
31. Doreen McBarnet, TransnationalTransactions: Legal Work, Cross-border Commerce and Global Regulation, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 98, 100 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002).
32. Id.
33. For example, a contract for the international sale of goods can set out procedures for examination,
notice, and chance to cure with respect to non-conforming goods. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, art. 37-39, 48, 1489 U.N.T.S. 59, 65-68.
34. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 56-96.
35. See, e.g., Francis Snyder, Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralismand European Law,
5 EuR. L.J. 334 (1999). Such regulation of contracting and sub-contracting relations can be linked to
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The control of private actors over both the substance and process of regulatory relationships is central to the renewed focus on the separation from state
processes of international business practice, the most recent version of the decades-old debate concerning lex mercatoria. In Teubner's striking analysis, the
combination of the substance of merchant law with the processes of international commercial arbitration is viewed as a prime example of how global
functional systems are generating "global law without a state."3 6 Functional
systems-such as business systems, human rights systems, and labor systemsreplace state systems in primary social significance and develop a separate and
autopoietic normative character in the generation and enforcement of regulating norms. For critics, this is an alarming turn, signaling37the creation by
business of a "global state of exception" from the rule of law.
This is a useful theoretical insight as to the global pluralism of social systems and its implications for norm generation and application. As an empirical
matter, however, the systems view of global society exaggerates the amount
of sociological and normative separation among systems. There remains significant overlap in both membership and subject matter. For example, global labor
is entwined with systems of global business. Moreover, functional systems are
cut across by ethnicity and nationality, creating phenomena such as crossborder business networks of overseas Chinese actors. 38 It seems misleading to
characterize global legal pluralism as anything other than a set of overlapping
systems defined by functional, ethnic, and national lines.
Perhaps because the purity of such systems is exaggerated, the claimed normative separation of transnational business systems from state law is also exaggerated.39 Even if merchant parties rarely litigate, they are aware of and act
in accordance with background private law as well as merchant norms. In this
sense, there has not been a transnational liftoff of global business from domestic
legal orders. 40 In addition, private law, such as tort law, is used by parties affected by transnational business conduct, but not governed by the terms or
processes of a negotiated private ordering. In sum, private law continues to
play a significant role in the regulation of private orders, and in the normative contestation among private orders.

NGO and civil society actions such as consumer boycotts. See NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO: TAKING AIM AT
THE BRAND BULLIES (1999).
36. Gunther Teubner, "Global Bukowina": Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
37. William Scheuerman, EconomicGlobalizationandthe Rule of Law, 6 CONSTELLATIONS 3, 6-8 (1999).
38. See, e.g., RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 325-420 (Richard Appelbaum et al. eds., 2001). It is notable that in the otherwise brilliant vol-

ume, GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 36, that ethnicity is barely mentioned.
39. See Wai, supra note 13, at 265-68.
40. For more on transnational liftoff, see id.
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III.

TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AS A REGULATORY PROCESS IN THE
GLOBAL ORDER

Transnational private law in national courts may be able to leverage its role as
a necessary "touchdown" point for international economic transactions into a
transnational regulatory role. For example, transnational tort litigation seeking compensation from multinational corporations can be interpreted as an ef41
fort to "ground" processes of self-regulation that straddle national boundaries.
Transnational private law may have further significance as well because private law has procedural advantages over processes of public regulation and
governance, particularly in a fragmented global society.
A. TransnationalPrivate Law and Problems of Global Representation
A turn to private law processes can be understood in the context of broader
problems of representation and governance in transnational society. The idea
that private law processes may provide better tools of governance is highlighted
by the work of Robert A. Kagan on adversarial legalism as a distinctively
"American" way of law and politics. 42 For Kagan, U.S. policymaking and dispute resolution are characterized by contestation in the form of law (legal rights,
duties, procedures, enforcement, penalties, litigation, and/or judicial review)
combined with litigant activism (contestation dominated by disputing parties or interests, often acting through lawyers). 43 Kagan includes private litigation as a major form of adversarial legalism.
Kagan notes that adversarial legalism can be a costly, uncertain, and distributively problematic means of regulation. 44 But he connects its use in the
United States to its appropriateness in a political culture that provides for extensive governmental protection but also mistrusts government; the result is
45
fragmented governmental authority and relatively weak hierarchical control.
Kagan identifies some virtues of this system in empowering social interests and
the excluded and in influencing public and private actors to act more effectively and justly.
The significance of private law as a regulatory tool depends on the comparative effectiveness of alternative processes. After decades of deregulation and
46
privatization, private law has renewed significance as a form of regulation.
Moreover, pressures on public regulation are intensified by restraints on national regulatory powers contained in international agreements (most notably, international trade agreements such as those of the WTO or international
47
investment treaties) as well as the broader forces of globalization.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 265-66.
KAGAN, supra note 27.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 29-33.
Id. at 35.
CUTLER, supra note 4, at 28-29.
This issue is neatly, albeit problematically, summed up by the notion of "new constitutionalism,"
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In addition to these recent pressures, the use of domestic public regulation for transnational regulation is hampered by the weak representation of
48
foreign interests and values inside domestic public regulatory processes. At
the supranational level, there are few political processes or institutions with
fully effective public regulatory authority. Comprehensive international regulation is consequently impeded by collective action problems such as regulatory gaps, free-rider problems, and regulatory competition, as well as genuine
differences in regulatory preferences. 49 The result is a global "society" with a
fragmented governmental authority and with relatively weak hierarchical control-the very conditions that Kagan identifies as explaining the turn to adversarial legalism as an alternative mode of governance.
B. The Advantages of TransnationalPrivate Law as a Representative Process
Transnational private law claims might sometimes provide a more accessible and effective point of access for disadvantaged foreign groups or individuals than would domestic legislative or administrative processes. While
claims under public processes such as human rights claims or appeals to public
regulators to regulate corporate actors in their foreign conduct are also possible, there are often severe practical impediments to effective extraterritorial
regulation by national regulators. Local regulators may not pursue the case
because of industry capture, inefficiency, shortage of resources, or restrictive
ideological conditions. It can be very difficult to convince public officials or
local bureaucrats to devote time and resources to complaints concerning foreign interests or values. 50
In such contexts, court-based private law strategies may offer better access
to the regulatory process. Private law claims are initiated and articulated by
the complaining party and not by public regulators. Civil damage awards,
including awards of punitive damages where available, are potentially far larger
than the maximum or realistic levels of fines imposed by state officials. The
relative distance of the adjudicator from majoritarian politics may lead to
different results. 51 For example, an adjudicator in a private law claim in na-

which constrains state power from "above." See, e.g., David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New
Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 757 (2000).
48. Eleanor Fox, Global Markets, National Law, and the Regulation of Business-A View from the Top, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 135 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002).
49. Id. See also Wai, supra note 13, at 250-58.
50. Bypassing blocked local venues is a key strategic use of international human rights. See THE
POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al.
eds., 1999). See also Craig Scott & Robert Wai, TransnationalGovernance of Corporate Conduct through the
Migrationof Human Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of TransnationalPrivate Litigation, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 287 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004) (describing
such a use of international human rights both across national boundaries and between public and private
systems of law).
51.

COLLINS, supra note 19, at 84.
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tional courts may have background, sentiments, or ideologies that are more
52
liberal and internationalist than the general population.
Furthermore, politics through private national courts may have different
results because of the normative character of law as a realm of argumentation
and justification. Adjudicators are typically required to hear and engage the
evidence and arguments of both sides. In contrast, domestic regulators, politicians, and the general population rarely directly engage, or even encounter,
injustices abroad, often because of geographical or other form of distance.
Faced with detailed evidence of particular claims made by individuals, a domestic judge or a local jury may be more sympathetic than when the injustices
or problems are too vast or not as salient.
Procedurally, private law may also offer helpful options, such as contingency fee arrangements and pro bono representation, to assist foreign parties
with access to local venues. 53 Private litigation claims may be better able to
make helpful connections to minority pockets of representative sympathies
inside other states, for example among civil society groups. Transnational private law claims-whether a particular piece of litigation or the development
of norms or standards-can clearly be part of the strategy of civil society
groups. Moreover, such legal claims and campaigns can often help facilitate
the building of transnational advocacy networks 54 and other countervailing
transnational civil society groups, thereby fostering broader processes of transnationalism.
While not capable of overcoming fundamentally parochial attitudes, private law litigation might help to bridge a structural gap or historical lag between political processes and underlying popular attitudes and sympathies
across borders. Public reactions to foreign disasters have often outstripped and
pressured official governmental reactions. 55 Rising moral and political expectations of others and of ourselves may accompany increasing global material
interdependence, 5 6 but puncturing entrenched interests and old habits of the
heart may require additional venues for contestation. Law, including private law,

52. Robert Wai, In the Name of the International. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Internationalist
Transformation of Private International Law, 39 CAN. YB. INT'L. L. 117, 143-55 (2001). Of course, local
judges may be biased against foreign parties. But see Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary:
Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120 (1996).
53. See CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,

2001).
54. MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).

55. See, e.g., A Surge in Donations Outpaces Expectations, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 3, 2005, at 5. A
similar gap between popular sentiments and government positions can be seen in the mass protests
against war in countries whose governments supported the recent intervention in Iraq. See Tariq Ali, Recolonizing Iraq, 21 NEW LEFT REV. 5 (May-June 2003).
56. Theorists of international justice have been arguing the normative relevance of actual increased
interdependence for some time. See, e.g., CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (1979).
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might be part of that contestation and could perhaps contribute to the recon57
struction of the emotive-sentimental foundations of our current world order.
IV.

COMMUNICATION, NORMS, AND INFORMATION:

THE IDEATIONAL FUNCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW IN A
TRANSNATIONAL ORDER OF COMPETING NORMS

The last observation suggests a further "ideational" or "communicative" function of transnational private law in a fragmented transnational order. In this
role, private law assists in the circulation of ideas and norms among social
systems, be they different functional areas, different identity groups, or different jurisdictions. This accords with a Habermasian vision of global political order as embedded in a lifeworld that "forms, as a whole, a network com58
posed of communicative actions."
A. LitigationasJamming or Branding
Cases such as the Bhopal litigation or the litigation concerning Unocal's
oil production in Burma 59 are not solely concerned with obtaining an award
for damages, or even imposing pressure for a settlement, but also with publicizing and exposing corporate conduct. 60 More generally, such cases are
part of an effort to intervene in the broader political debate about corporate
social responsibility in the global economic system. International relations
scholars increasingly identify the importance of norms not just in narrow
functional terms, but also in their role in framing and constructing national
interests. 6I This function may be especially significant during the current
62
period of flux in the processes of transnational governance.
The communicative or ideational function of private action has been articulated with respect to the communicative acts of civil society groups such
as peace and environmental movements. These methods include a diverse
array of direct and indirect action that does not always involve public regulation, such as "culture jamming. '63 The communicative nature of such civil

57. See COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION (Pheng Cheah & Bruce
Robbins eds., 1998); Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993, at 111 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
58. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY

OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 354 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
59. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
60. Consider how litigation provided an important basis for the civil protest that emerged around the
Nigerian oil activities of Shell or surrounding the defense against the McDonald's libel action in Britain.
See KLEIN, supra note 35, at 387-93; JOHN VIDAL, MCLIBEL: BURGER CULTURE ON TRIAL (1997).
61. See FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS (1989).
62. See Scott & Wai, supra note 50.
63. There can also be intricate interplay between social protest and public action. See BALAKRISHNAN
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action is demonstrated clearly in anti-branding campaigns.M In this context,
private law complaints, including litigation, can be, inter alia, a mechanism
for shining light upon private conduct, convincing third parties to join a boycott, or publicizing state inaction.
B. Litigation and Information Flow
An important part of litigation is its use in the circulation of information
into global public spheres. Litigation can dislodge information from an otherwise inaccessible private party, for example through discovery obligations
in civil procedure. Release of information may also occur where burdens of proof
are reversed because of the difficulty for plaintiffs of ascertaining detailed
evidence on internal or past procedures. 65 Information generated through
litigation can also be useful for third parties. 66 The loss of this public inforprivate dispute resolution
mation function is one of the costs of channeling
67
into arbitration, which is generally confidential.
C. Policy Argumentation and Contestation Within PrivateLaw
Transnational private litigation can also be understood as performing a
critical ideational function in global governance by generating challenges to
dominant normative frameworks of world politics. In this vision, transnational
private law may contribute to the contestation of insular normative systems,
including (a) networks of business actors; (b) closed national legal and political regimes; and (c) international institutions with particular normative
practices. This conception of private law actions fits with views of the contemporary transnational order as a system of countervailing networks and
68
systems.
Teubner's work on social systems as autopoietic normative systems highlights that different functional systems tend to be dominated by distinctive
kinds of framing rationalities and argumentative discourses. 69 This picture
of a world of multiple normative systems raises the question of how these different systems can come into contact and influence each other. In systems analysis,
64. E.g., KLEIN, supra note 35; Mark Dery, CultureJamming: Hacking, Slacking, and Sniping in an Empire of Signs, 25 OPEN MAG. PAMPHLET SERIES 1 (1993). See Robert Wai, Countering, Branding, DealingUsing Economic and Social Rights in and Around the InternationalTrade Regime, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 35 (2003)
(making a similar argument about the use of international human rights law in the trade regime).
65. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 89-90.
66. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
67. Scheuerman, supra note 37, at 8.
68. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 54. See also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER
(2004) (describing a web of transgovernmental networks, including the circulation of ideas and processes
among private law judges).
69. Gunther Teubner, Altera Pars Audiatur: Law in the Collision of Discourses, in LAW, SOCIETY AND
ECONOMY: CENTENARY
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the law, including private law, is one normative system where this contact
occurs. Private law attempts to recognize the social reality of other systems,
such as economy or science, in order to maintain its relevance, but this comes at
the cost of challenges to its own normative coherence. 70 Elsewhere, I have argued that transnational private law can be viewed as having clashing structures of policy argumentation not unlike the collision of policy discourses that
Teubner describes as characterizing law more generally. 7' No single rationality or discourse dominates private international law and private law; rather,
there is an array of different goals and priorities that generate a force field of
72
policy concerns.
Because of this orientation toward plural values and interests, transnational
private law is a venue for the contact and mutual influence of different systems. Like other forms of law, it may be a "sluice" for the communication of
ideas. 73 In this role, private law as state law may claim the greater legitimacy of
a system with a normative commitment to procedural fairness and justice
74
among all of the various interests and values of society.
At the same time, because private law depends on private initiative to bring,
frame, and sustain claims, it may help to generate normative deliberation that
cannot be achieved through pre-emptively managerial public regulation and
paternalistic social welfare law. 75 In this respect, private law may contribute
to the democratic opinion- and will-formation that depends on "supplies coming from the informal contexts of communication found in the public sphere,
76
in civil society, and in spheres of private life."
D. Normative ContestationAmong and Across Contemporary Normative Orders
Beyond contestation inside private law, transnational private law should also
be understood to encourage contestation among and across other normative
orders. Although "collision of discourses" can occur inside open systems, Teubner emphasizes the separate and autopoietic aspect of functional systems other
than the law, where there can be only indirect normative influence on each other
through "co-evolution."7 7 The result seems to be a "heterarchy" of norm-pro-

70. TEUBNER, supra note 30, at 100-06.
71. Scott & Wai, supra note 50, at 290-91. Cf. Teubner, supra note 69, at 156-59.
72. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685
(1976); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principleof Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 95 (2000).
73. HABERMAS, supra note 58, at 354-58.
74. For example, Habermas observes, "The constitutional structure of the political system is preserved
only if government officials hold out against corporate bargaining partners and maintain an asymmetrical
position that results from their obligation to represent the whole of an absent citizenry, whose will is
embodied in the wording of statutes.". Id. at 350. See generally id. ch. 8.
75. Id. at 407-08. Habermas refers to possible use of private law remedies, including in the liability
area, although he seemingly concludes that private law is too narrow and inaccessible to the public. Id at

411.
76. Id. at 352.
77. TEUBNER, supra note 30, at 61-65.
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to rely principally on conducing systems, in which contestation would seem
7
8
.
processes
social
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In contrast with this elegant model, I believe there is more cross-contamination at the normative level inside each social system, not just within state legal
systems. 79 In a complex transnational context, any single normative system will
involve contestation among cross-cutting interests of multiple actors and networks.80 The cross-cutting and open texture of normative systems creates the
possibility that transnational private litigation and transactions could act as
linkage and transmission points for contesting dominant but problematically insular values inside other normative systems, whether those are functional systems, parochial national political systems, or other legal regimes.
Transnational private law may frame normative challenges to policy frameworks that dominate other regimes, by specifying contradictions and ambiguities in those frameworks, by identifying legitimate but ignored social purposes, and by realizing workable alternatives that are not hampered by exaggerated traditional concerns, such as for state sovereignty. In this task, litigants
may be able to align with and empower minority or latent critical normative
strands of other systems. These functions of legal arguments are demonstrated by, for example, the use of international social and economic rights arthe "miguments by non-state actors in and around the trade regime81 and
82
settings.
law
private
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V.

DECENTRALIZED COORDINATION AND TRANSNATIONAL COMITY IN A

PLURAL SYSTEM

By way of conclusion, this Article asks how transnational private law institutions should act in light of their distinctive regulatory and ideational
functions in a world of plural normative fields.
Transnational private law institutions cannot assume total control, since
private law depends on private ordering and private claims. Indeed, much of
its distinctive strength for purposes of regulation and normative contestation comes from the reliance on private ordering and initiative. Effectiveness
in such an indirect form of governance requires an intricate balancing of incentives for non-state actors. This is evident with respect to setting the rules for
contractual bargaining (including special rules in particular sectors such as
consumer contracts or employment contracts), but also in non-contractual con-

78. Gunther Teubner, Foreword: Legal Regimes of Global Non-State Actors, GLO3AL LAW WITHOUT A
STATE, supra note 36, at xiii.

79. I would thus apply Teubner's model of law as a conflict of rationalities or collision of discourses to
the description of non-legal normative systems. See TEUBNER, supra note 30, at 104-06; Teubner, supra
note 69.
80. In this regard, I would argue that Teubner takes a wrong (if productive) turn toward systems
analysis and away from the more complex overlapping groups analysis of his mentor Rudolf Wiitholter.
See TEUBNER, supra note 30, at 108.

81. See Wai, supra note 64.
82. See Scott & Wai, supra note 50.
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texts. For example, what mix of substantive and procedural rules will facilitate the best compensatory and social deterrence results with respect to products
liability? Should punitive damages be added as a remedy? Treble damages?
Reversed burdens of proof? Class actions?
The effectiveness of transnational private law also depends on what is happening in other regimes of regulation and governance at both the domestic
and international level. The task for private law varies, for instance, depending on whether public regulation at the international or domestic level is
working well. There are a number of ways to conceive of this task of private
law. For example, transnational private law might be a kind of "jurisdictional interface." 83 Or we might again turn to conflict of laws for inspiration.
Christian Joerges has for some time used a conflict of laws framework to understand the relation between multiple normative systems in European and global
contexts; his work emphasizes the reality of the policy stakes of each system's norms, the need to avoid reducing the complex nature of the conflict
of among system norms, and attention to the legitimacy of the different systems.84 Teubner invokes the idea of "intersystemic" conflict of laws to capture
the way in which negotiation and adjustment as between systems can occur
even in the face of complexity. In Teubner's model, conflict of laws models suggest, for example, that state laws might resist juridification of conflicts between social subsystems, balance interests among social spheres rather than individuals, and resist the effort to unify emerging specialized subjects of law.8 5
Craig Scott and I have tried to argue for a more activist conception of the
role of private law courts in a process of transnationalcomity with respect to
transnational corporate liability and human rights concerns.8 6 Courts would
consider what is happening not only in other courts at other levels, but also
in the different levels of political process. For example, we see transnational
comity in the decision by U.S. courts to restrain civil tort actions against German companies for forced labor during World War II because of the negotiated agreement establishing the German "Foundation for Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future." But comity should not obscure that transnational
private litigation was an important part of the overall social process. In this
sense, comity is an awareness of the norms and processes of other systems (state
or functional), not blanket deference. 87 Sometimes precisely what is needed
is a domestic private law process in order to fill a regulatory or communications gap in the transnational society. And sometimes what is needed is to pro83. David Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims, in HARMONIZATION AND CHANGE, TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL WORKSHOP ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 1, 3

(Jacob Ziegel ed., 1995), cited in CUTLER, supra note 4, at 224-25. This recalls John Jackson's early characterization of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as an "interface" system. JOHN H. JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 218-21 (1989).
84. See, e.g., Christian Joerges, The Impact of European Integrationon Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions,
True Conflicts anda New ConstitutionalPerspective, 3 EUR. L.J. 378, 396-407 (1997).
85. TEUBNER, supra note 30, at 107-15.
86. Scott & Wai, supra note 50, at 309.
87. Cf Joel Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991).
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vide for a creative overlap of venues, not their perfect rationalization. A mix
of regimes might then apply, and indeed there can be a need for the blending of
provisions or processes among different systems. s8 The blend, of applicable
norms should be understood to include both state and other forms of "governing" norms.8 9
In this vein, transnational private law institutions cleverly strategize in light
of other systems, blending elements of disaggregated systems and acting as
flexibly and pragmatically as do parties in creating their private orders.90 The
wide-ranging and plural approach to transnational business problems thereby
proves a promising approach not just for business actors, but for governance
in transnational society more generally.

88. In international business law, dpefage, which refers to the situation in which different governing
laws are applicable to different parts of a complex transaction, exemplifies such mixing. See, e.g., Rome
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1980, arts. 3(1), 4(1), 1605
U.N.T.S. 80, at 81-82; DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 7, at 1205-08 (on dpefage).
89. A nascent form of this self-conscious mixing of processes may have been evidenced in the Bhopal
litigation where the court, staying the action in New York for reasons of forum non conveniens, imposed a
number of conditions on its stay, including that Union Carbide submit to the jurisdiction of the Indian
courts and consent to the broad discovery procedures available under U.S. rules of civil procedure. In Re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842, 852, 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cit. 1987).
90. See McBarnet, supra note 31.

